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Restrictive State and Local Immigration Laws:
Solutions in Search of Problems
Pratheepan Gulasekaram* & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan**
I.

Introduction

In its 2012 Arizona v. United States decision, the Supreme Court mostly struck down
Arizona’s unilateral attempt to create and enforce its own immigration enforcement scheme,
intended to diminish the undocumented immigrant population within the state, and presumably
the nation as well. Nevertheless, one important provision of the state law—directing state and
local law enforcement officers to check the immigration status of those whom they stop, arrest,
or detain—survived the Court’s review and is now in effect. This outcome, both in what was
enjoined and what was not, is significant for the field of immigration federalism. Similar cases
from Alabama and Georgia will likely be appealed to the Supreme Court, and the laws of several
local jurisdictions will be affected by Arizona and pending federal court cases. While a majority
of the Court reaffirmed federal supremacy in the field of immigration, it also continued the
process of carving out areas of appropriate subfederal, i.e. state and local, participation. The
Arizona dissents viewed state power even more expansively, including one opinion suggesting
that states had the inherent authority to expel unwanted persons from within their borders.
An important, yet overlooked, aspect of the case is the factual assumptions about
unlawful migration, and the public policy challenges caused by such migration, proffered by
both the majority and dissenting opinions. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted “the
pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to
the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration.” While he did not
specify what those consequences are, Justice Scalia’s dissent was much more explicit:
Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration
problem. Its citizens feel themselves under siege by large numbers
of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social
services, and even place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials
have been unable to remedy the problem, and indeed have recently
shown that they are unwilling to do so.1
Notably, despite relying on these specific factual claims about the effects of unlawful migration,
Scalia neglected to provide sources for these seemingly crucial truths. Judge Posner of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University (J.D., Stanford Law School).
** Associate Professor, University of California, Riverside (PhD, Political Science, Princeton University).
The ideas presented in this Issue Brief are developed in detail in Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The New
Immigration Federalism (awaiting submission, draft on file with authors) (forthcoming 2013), from which we have
excerpted selected portions here. In addition, the politicized account of sub-federal immigration lawmaking is
developed in detail in Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism,
ARIZ. ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2012).
1
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

1

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took Justice Scalia to task for this omission, arguing that such
assertions are “sufficiently inflammatory to call for a citation to some reputable source of such
hyperbole. Justice Scalia cites nothing to support it.”2
Instead of verifying his claims, Scalia relied on the intuitive and seemingly commonsense proposition that demographic changes have been driving Arizona’s immigration policies.
By extension then, we might also believe that other states that have enacted similar laws – like
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Utah– are justifiably and necessarily forced to act. Indeed,
Scalia’s sympathy for the plight of helpless states directly informs his implausible vision of a
constitutional order in which states can create their own immigration laws. He, however, is not
alone in believing that demographic changes and their attendant policy challenges galvanize and
justify subfederal immigration lawmaking. Indeed, many elected officials, advocates, and even
scholars have viewed the geographic spread of immigrants, and the geographic spread of
restrictive legislation on immigration as intimately linked. For example, Lou Barletta, mayor of a
small city in central Pennsylvania that was among the earliest to pass a restrictive ordinance,
testified to Congress that “[i]n Hazelton, illegal immigration is not some abstract debate about
walls and amnesty, but it is a tangible, very real problem.”3 Immigration scholars, while mostly
declining to endorse state and local enforcement schemes, have also assumed the salience of
these factors in accounting for the rise of state and local immigration laws.4 And, many media
reports have also invoked this same wisdom, of immigration-induced changes leading inexorably
to policy pressures and legislative action at the local level.5
Because of the pervasiveness of this demography-based explanation, we sought to verify
the importance of migration shifts and policy problems in the rise of state and local responses.
We empirically tested the rationales proffered to support such laws, to wit, increased recent
immigration, economic stress, and language isolation. Surprisingly, our analysis revealed that
demographic factors associated with new immigration and attendant policy challenges are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for state and local immigration laws. That is to say,
there are thousands of jurisdictions where demographic change does not lead to ordinance
2

Richard A. Posner, Justice Scalia is Upset about Illegal Immigration. But Where is His Evidence?, SLATE, June 27,
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2

activity and there are many jurisdictions where restrictive legislation has been passed in the
absence of significant local demographic pressures. Admittedly, necessary and sufficient
conditions constitute a high bar for empirical verification, as outlier cases can invalidate claims
using this deterministic approach. Even adopting a probabilistic approach and running
multivariate regressions on state and municipal legislative activity, we find that demographic
changes and their attendant policy challenges have no predictive power. Thus, the primary
justifications undergirding most scholarly, political, and judicial explanations for this recent
spate of state and local immigration regulations have little empirical support.
So, if immigration-induced demographic change does not explain this recent spate of
state and local immigration laws, what does? The answer, not coincidentally, returns to where we
started. Beyond its unsupported factual claims, commentators criticized Scalia’s Arizona dissent
for stepping outside the proper bounds of judicial temperament, and for its overtly partisan
rhetoric. Scalia earned these scathing reviews in large part because of his conspicuous evaluation
of the Obama Administration’s recent policy decision to defer deportation prosecution for young,
law-abiding undocumented students. This policy was announced two weeks after oral arguments
in Arizona and is nowhere in the record or judicial documents relevant to the case. While oddly
placed in a judicial opinion, the overtly political flavor of Scalia’s dissent is symptomatic of a
deeper change in immigration law and policy over the past three decades. Past Presidents like
Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton mustered bipartisan support for their federal immigration
overhauls in 1986 and 1996, respectively. Since 2001, however, immigration has increasingly
polarized along party lines, with determined and cohesive party-line votes blocking passage of
widely-supported comprehensive federal overhaul efforts and very popular stand-alone bills like
the DREAM Act.6
The role of partisanship and political maneuvering in advancing restrictive legislation is
evident not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels. What most subfederal
jurisdictions with immigration enforcement laws share is not economic stress or
overconsumption of public goods or heightened violent crime, but rather a partisan composition
within their legislative and executive branches that is highly receptive to enforcement heavy
proposals. Indeed, our nationwide study of 50 states and over 25,000 local jurisdictions, revealed
that – after controlling for the demographic factors – political affiliation was the most important
and significant factor in explaining the proposal and passage of these laws. These highly partisan
contexts, in turn, serve as fertile ground for external issue entrepreneurs, such as the Immigration
Reform Law Institute (IRLI) and Kansas Secretary of State Kris W. Kobach, who offer
restrictive laws as pre-packaged solutions in search of immigration problems.
This Issue Brief briefly presents the data and conclusions from our empirical study of
state and local immigration laws, and then considers some of the potential implications of these
conclusions. It seeks to showcase the importance of partisanship in explaining the spread of state
6

Among other things, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors, or “DREAM,” Act would provide
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IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Sep. 16, 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/dream-act-resourcepage; Americans Agree: Protecting DREAMERS is a No-Brainer, AMERICA’S VOICE ONLINE (June 2012),
http://americasvoiceonline.org/polls/americans-agree-protecting-dreamers-is-a-no-brainer/.
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and local laws, while discounting the conventional wisdom that these enactments are organic
policy responses to pressing demographic needs. It cautions that judicial opinions, legal theories,
and political rhetoric based on these commonly-held assumptions must be reconsidered.
II.

The Empirical Validity of Demographic Explanations for State and Local Immigration
Regulation

Recently, states and localities have renewed their interest in immigration regulation. The
National Council of State Legislatures reports over 7,000 state immigration proposals over the
last five years.7 States and localities are increasingly considering and passing laws that create
state immigration crimes, enact state immigration enforcement schemes, regulate the renting of
property to certain non-citizens, penalize businesses for hiring unauthorized workers, and
discriminate in the provision of public services. In most instances, the stated aim of this
restrictive legislation is to discourage entry or residence of unauthorized immigrants, or what
many restrictionists have called “attrition through enforcement.”8
Our purpose in this section is to explore why subnational governments have vigorously
reentered the field of immigration regulation, testing widely held assumptions regarding this
question. More specifically, we ask: Why do some places in the United States adopt restrictive
legislation while others adopt more permissive legislation? We focus on this question because if
states and localities are responding to objectively measurable policy challenges, we would expect
that other jurisdictions facing similar population changes and concerns would be likely to
consider and replicate these legislative solutions.9 We answer the question as it involves state
laws and local ordinances, and we analyze corresponding sets of legislative data: a collection of
state legislation and local ordinance information from 2005-2010.10 In analyzing this data, our
goal is to determine the relative importance and weight of several factors that have been
proffered by commentators and elected representatives to explain the recent spate of subnational
lawmaking. These commonly accepted explanations comprise what we term the “conventional”
theory or model of subnational immigration regulation.
A.

The Conventional Explanation for State and Local Laws

The conventional explanation for the recent spate of state and local laws should be
familiar to anyone paying attention to immigration policy. It holds that the policy stalemate at the
federal level, combined with the pressure created by the public policy challenges of recent and
rapid demographic changes, compel states and localities to legislate in a field they would rather
7

BROOKE MEYER & ANN MORSE, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1–
DEC. 7, 2011), NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/stateimmigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx.
8
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (explicitly invoking this frame in Section 1 of the law: “The
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state
and local government agencies in Arizona.”), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf.
9
See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Significance of the Local, supra note 4, at 609.
10
A prior version of the research in this section appears in S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship,
Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica Varsanyi, ed. 2011).
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avoid, but now have no choice but to enter. In this explanation, federal inaction and subfederal
activity are independent phenomena, unconnected both theoretically and descriptively – federal
inaction simply happens, and that pre-existing fact serves as the starting point for analysis.
Accordingly, state and local lawmaking is framed as a necessary response, occasioned by
objectively understood, unique public policy challenges faced by particular jurisdictions.11
This sentiment was neatly encapsulated by Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona in her
signing statement accompanying the passage of S.B. 1070, which created a state immigration
enforcement scheme and provided state criminal penalties for immigration violations:
The bill I’m about to sign into law – Senate Bill 1070 – represents
another tool for our state to use as we work to solve a crisis we did
not create and the federal government has refused to fix…. The
crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border.12
The City of Valley Park, Missouri also highlights specific problems purportedly caused by
unlawful immigrants:
[I]llegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our
hospitals to fiscal hardship and our residents to substandard quality
of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing
their costs and diminishing their availability, diminishes our
overall quality of life, and endangers the security and safety of the
homeland.13
The chief virtue of this conventional explanation is its simplicity and intuitive appeal; in
other words, it just seems right. In addition to the widespread acceptance that immigration policy
has reached a stalemate at the national level, it also makes intuitive sense that rapid migration
and demographic change are causing significant social dislocation and prompting redistribution
of some public goods. In addition, current economic study suggests that the fiscal benefits of
immigration are more likely to be concentrated at the national level, while any short-term fiscal
costs are more likely to be borne by specific localities, particularly with respect to the provision
of public education, social services, and emergency room care. 14 Similarly, news stories have
devoted extensive coverage of complaints by state and local government officials over
overcrowded housing, schools, and emergency rooms. 15 And, it is evident that immigrants in
11

Cristina M. Rodríguez, Significance of the Local, supra note 4 at 575 (discussing the “familiar rhetoric” of federal
failure as the justification of state and local involvement).
12
Press Release, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, Statement by Governor Brewer on the signing of Senate Bill 1070
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf.
13
Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1722, § 1 C (2008) (stating purpose of city’s illegal immigrant employment and
rental law). See also, H.B. 56 § 2, 2011 Reg. Sess, (Ala. 2011) (“the State of Alabama finds that illegal immigration
is causing economic hardship and lawlessness.”).
14
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF
IMMIGRATION 254-296, (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
15
See Lou Dobbs Tonight: Broken Borders (CNN television broadcast May 2, 2007); See also Alex Kotlowitz, Our
Town, supra note 5.
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recent years have been moving to “new destinations”—areas with little or no history of
immigrant settlement in the past century.16 The emergence of these new destinations augments
the narrative of rapid, recent demographic change that many assume to cause state and local
legislative reactions. Despite the several appealing aspects to this model of demographicallyinduced legislative action, upon closer evidentiary analysis, this model does not hold.
B.

Empirically Testing the Conventional Model
1.

Hypothesized Factors Necessitating State and Local Response

Using our original data set of about 25,000 localities,17 we tested the importance of the
following factors hypothesized to contribute to the proposal or passage of subnational
immigration regulation:


Population of New Immigrants, and Growth of Latino and Foreign-Born Populations 18



High Proportions of Linguistically-Isolated Households



Overcrowded Housing



Latino Share and Naturalized Share of the Citizen Population



Economic Stress and Relative Group Deprivation



State-Level Policy Climate



Local Economic Interests



Party Composition of the Electorate

16

These so-called “new destinations” include places ranging from rural Kansas and North Carolina to suburbs in
Long Island and Georgia that have had little recent history of immigration. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GATEWAYS:
IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (Brookings Institution Press, Audrey Singer, Susan Wiley
Hardwick & Caroline Brettell, eds., 2008).
17
Our information on restrictive activity at the municipal level is based on lists collected by various legal defense
organizations and validated by making phone calls to jurisdictions noted as considering or passing ordinances, as
well as by monitoring news stories on local ordinances. We merged information on the proposal and passage of
ordinances with census data from the larger universe of over 25,000 localities (municipalities, villages, and places).
We use the shorthand “cities” to refer to these types of government, to contrast them with county governments. At
the state level, two graduate student research assistants coded legislative summaries provided by the National
Conference of State Legislatures based on their topic, valence, and severity.
18
We use “recent immigrants” as a proxy measure for the likelihood of a high unauthorized migrant population. It is
not possible to attain accurate data on numbers of unauthorized migrants in most localities, but we expect recent
immigrants to be composed of a high percentage of unauthorized migrants. In addition, using this broader
description accounts for the “new destinations” trope in current restrictionist discourse.
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Immigrant criminality or increase in crime-rate could also be added as a hypothesized
demographic factor causing state and local response. However, we do not independently test that
hypothesis with our data set, and thus do not include it in our list of hypothesized and tested
factors. Instead, we rely on the substantial empirical work already completed in this area by
social scientists. They have proven that increased immigrant criminality is a “myth,” with lower
incarceration rates amongst recent immigrants than the native-born population. 19 Further, in
many jurisdictions passing restrictive ordinances, overall crime and violent crime have decreased
in the past several years, in the same time span that the demographic problems purportedly
caused by undocumented immigrants have captured state and local attention.20
Finally, while the presence or absence of prior state legislation is a potentially important
factor in explaining municipal ordinance activity on immigration, it is also important to explain
what factors, if any, explain restrictive laws at the state level. Many of the factors that we
hypothesize to predict local legislative activity are also relevant for state activity, albeit at a
different scale. Thus, we are able to obtain measures of the population of new immigrants, the
growth of Latino and foreign-born populations, and the unemployment rates of whites and blacks
at the state level.
2.

Data and Statistical Findings21
a.

Cities

In our dataset of over 25,000 cities across the United States, from May 2006 to December
2011, 125 had proposed restrictive ordinances and 93 had proposed pro-immigrant ordinances,
including measures limiting cooperation with federal authorities on deportations. 22 On the
restrictionist side, approximately 63 percent of proposals had passed, about 12 percent had been
voted down or tabled, and a quarter were still pending. On the “pro” side, the vast majority of
proposals had passed, with only two pending and one classified as failed or tabled.
19

See RUBEN G. RUMBAUT AND WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, SPECIAL REPORT, THE MYTH OF
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND
FOREIGN BORN MEN 1-2 (Spring 2007).
20
Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010 (“the rate
of violent crime at the border, and indeed across Arizona, has been declining, according to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation...”), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/20crime.html.
21
We have not included a full explanation of our data set, our statistical methods, and models here. Readers
interested in reviewing the statistical work and analysis in greater detail may contact the authors (karthick@ucr.edu
or pgulasekaram@scu.edu). In addition, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in
Immigration Federalism, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), contains a richer discussion of both the quantitiative
and qualititative empirical work referenced herein.
22
The restrictive ordinances in our sample include measures whereby local governments use their official capacities
to enforce federal immigration laws or to address perceived negative societal consequences of illegal immigration.
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA) ordinances and variants of them constitute the majority of these restrictive
measures. IIRAs commonly refer to the fiscal and governance challenges arising from the presence of illegal
immigrants. The pro-immigrant ordinances in our sample include resolutions and mandates that express opposition
to immigration raids and restrictionist national legislation, those barring the use of public funds to enforce
immigration laws, and those with explicit “sanctuary” policies whereby local officials do not inquire about legal
status and do not notify immigration authorities about the status of individuals unless they are convicted of serious
crimes.

7

Cities with restrictive policies are but a small fraction of the thousands of communities in
the United States that are transforming due to recent international migration. Among cities that
passed restrictive ordinances, new immigrants averaged about 3 percent of the total resident
population, slightly higher than the 1 percent average for cities across the country.23 This small
difference in the proportion of new immigrants diminishes even further in significance when
conducting a statistical analysis that controls for other explanatory factors.
Even taking the case of a restrictionist city with the highest proportion of recent
immigrants—Herndon, Virginia, where recent immigrants accounted for 14.5 percent of the
town’s residents in 2000—we find that 129 other cities took no action, despite having even
higher proportions of recent immigrants, including 23 with recent immigrants accounting for
over 25 percent of the town’s residents. Indeed, the majority of jurisdictions that can claim to
share the necessary demographic factors—such as growth in immigrant populations, having a
recently-arrived immigrant population, or a high proportion of Spanish-speakers among
immigrants—do not propose or pass immigrant-related laws.
Even if immigration-induced change within a jurisdiction is insufficient, by itself, to
provoke legislative response, might such change be a shared characteristic of enacting
jurisdictions? We find that 29 out of the 79 localities that have passed restrictive ordinances (or
37% of the cases) have recent immigrant populations that are below the national average for
cities. Indeed, in a fifth of the cases (16 out of 79), recent immigrants accounted for fewer than
0.5 percent of the city’s residents, and in these places the proportion of Spanish-dominant
households was less than 3 percent of all households in the city.
In order to arrive at more systematic answers about the conditions under which cities may
consider and pass restrictive ordinances, we ran a multivariate regression that can show the
contribution of each individual factor while controlling for all other factors.24 How do each of
these potential explanations fare?
Population of New Immigrants, and Growth of Latino and Foreign-Born Populations.
Having an immigrant population that is composed primarily of recent arrivals (or, having
experienced a recent upsurge in Latino or immigrant populations) is not associated with
restrictive ordinances. Indeed, it is associated with a greater likelihood of pro-immigrant
legislation. Our alternative measure, of the growth of the foreign-born population between 1990
23

These figures are means (averages). We use data from the 2000 Census, given missing data in the 2005-9
American Community Survey file. The corresponding median figures are 1.72% for restrictive ordinance cities, and
0.16% for cities in the nation as a whole.
24
Importantly, we remained attuned to issues of multicollinearity, where putting two factors that are closely related
into the same explanatory model produces erratic results for those factors. Since some of these factors are highly
correlated, we ran alternative model specifications instead of putting every factor in the same regression model. For
full model results, see our working paper Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Importance of
the Political in Immigration Federalism (unpublished manuscript), http://karthick.com/workingpapers_assets/GRsubmission-2-23.pdf. We used CLARIFY to simulate the effects on the dependent variable of changes in each
individual variable while holding other variables at their means. See Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King,
CLARIFY: Software For Interpreting And Presenting Statistical Results, 8 J. OF STAT. SOFTWARE 1-30 (2003).
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and 2000, or between 2000 and 2007, also has no statistically significant relationship with
restrictive ordinance activity, although it is associated with a lower likelihood of pro-immigrant
ordinances. Finally, a fast-growing Latino population in the locality, regardless of their
citizenship and immigration status, is associated with a marginally greater likelihood of
restrictive ordinances being proposed, but not passed.
Linguistically-isolated Households & Overcrowded Housing. Factors related to recent
arrivals, such as the proportion of households that are exclusively Spanish-speaking and the
proportion of households that are overcrowded, also bore no relationship to the proposal or
passage of restrictive ordinances up until 2007. Since then, however, the growth of Spanishspeaking households has made a marginal difference in the probability of restrictive proposal and
passage (increasing by 4% and 7%, respectively). These effects pale in comparison to those
associated with local contexts of partisanship, discussed below.
Latino share and naturalized share of the citizen population. We included these
measures in two separate equations given their high level of collinearity. These factors do not
bear any significant relationship to the proposal and passage of local ordinances, whether
restrictive or permissive. This further reinforces findings from other studies of local immigrant
incorporation that immigrant electoral power may be less important in predicting local
government policies toward immigrants today than in the past.25
Economic stress and relative group deprivation. There is no support for the contention
that economic stress or relative deprivation (as measured by absolute or relative poverty rates,
respectively) among white residents is related to the proposal or passage of restrictive legislation.
Indeed, when relative measures of poverty are used, cities with whites who are relatively better
off than Latinos are more likely to propose restrictive policies. However, when it comes to the
passage of policies, there is no significant relationship. Finally, black relative deprivation is
indeed associated with a higher likelihood of restrictive proposals, but not policy passage. It is
unlikely that blacks are driving the proposal of restrictive legislation in most of these cities, since
in none of these places are blacks the majority, and they are over a third of the population in only
one case (Norristown, PA).
State-level policy climate toward immigrants. This factor bears no significant
relationship to ordinance activity at the local level. For state-local dynamics, neither the “steam
valve” model (localities adversely reacting to state-level policy) nor the “demonstration effect”
model (mimicking state level activity) are at play.
Local economic interests. The prevalence of industrial sectors that are heavily dependent
on immigrant workers is not significantly related to local ordinances, with one important
exception: the likelihood of restrictive policies being passed is much lower in places where
agriculture accounts for a sizable number of jobs. It is important to note, however, that the
effects are evident in the stage of ordinance passage, but not ordinance proposal. This suggests

25

S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & PAUL G. LEWIS, IMMIGRANTS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THE VIEW FROM CITY
HALL, SAN FRANCISCO, CA: PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA (2005).
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that policy entrepreneurs in agricultural areas may have overreached by pushing for restrictive
policies only to find an organized opposition from local businesses to such plans.26
Partisan composition. Among our hypothesized factors, partisanship has the strongest
and most consistent effects. After controlling for all other factors, cities in Republican-majority
areas are about 2.5 times more likely to propose restrictive ordinances, and they are about 4
times as likely to pass such ordinances compared to Democratic-majority areas. By contrast, on
the pro-immigrant side of enforcement, cities in Democratic-majority counties were about 4
times as likely as those in Republican-majority areas to propose and pass such legislation.
b.

States

During this same period, legislation at the state level was much more common, with
1,321 laws enacted between 2005 and 2010. Of these, we coded 317 as restrictive, with at least
one such law passed in 46 states. These laws ranged in terms of their policy area (e.g., education,
law enforcement, public benefits) and in their severity (e.g., ranging from revoking licenses of
notaries public who have been denaturalized, to laws denying access to state public benefits to
unauthorized immigrants). 27 Taking into consideration only those restrictive laws that we
classified as having a significant impact on a state’s unauthorized immigrant resident
population,28 the number of laws during this time period drops to 155, with Arizona passing the
most laws (15), followed by Virginia (10), and Georgia (9).
Illustrating again that demographic change is not sufficient to produce restrictionist
legislation, of the top 25% of states where new immigrants make up a sizable portion of the
overall population, only 6 of 13 states passed significant restrictive laws during this time. In the
multivariate regressions, we test for several variations of demographic change, including the
proportion of new immigrants, the proportional change in the foreign born population, and the
absolute level of immigration in the area. On the other end of the demographic spectrum, we find
that 9 of 12 states at the bottom quartile on this measure passed restrictive laws. Indeed, the
passage of restrictive laws is highest for this bottom quartile of states, and lowest among the top
quartile. Clearly demographic disruptions caused by recent immigration are also not necessary
for state-level restrictive action.
In our multivariate regression analysis that controls for various other factors, the statelevel models reveal no support for the hypothesis that restrictive legislation is more likely in
states where immigrants have arrived recently, or alternatively, states with the biggest growth in
the foreign-born population. Indeed, in some variations of our model, we find less restrictive
activity in states with recent immigrant populations. For most of our demographic factors
26

Cf. Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738, 765 (1997)
(noting the effects of strong union opposition).
27
2007 ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, 2-34 (rev. Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007Immigrationfinal.pdf.
28
The legislative summaries were coded on an ordinal scale of 1:“low impact” and 2:“high impact” on immigrant
rights and/or access to benefits, based on the provision’s likely effects on immigrant life chances and the number of
immigrants likely to be affected.
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(including poverty rates and growth of the immigrant population), the findings are inconsistent,
perhaps due to the small number of cases being analyzed (50 states).
In the case of partisanship, however, the results are consistently significant. After
controlling for various demographic factors, states with a majority of Republican voters have
passed more than twice as many significant pieces of restrictive legislation (four, on average,
during this period) as those states with a high proportion of Democratic voters (1.6, on average).
Another way to look at the state results is to differentiate between those states with multiple
pieces of significant restrictive legislation (three or more) versus the rest. Republican-majority
states are nearly 300% more likely to be in this group than Democratic-majority states.29 Finally,
we also update the analysis to account for laws enacted outside of the 2005-2010 period, by
analyzing all current state laws on enforcement and work verification.30 Here, too, we find that
partisanship has the strongest effect on the existence of restrictive state-level policies, and that
factors such as the growth of the foreign-born population or the recency of the immigrant
population do not matter.
C.

Partisanship and the Political Process

To sum up, our analysis shows that the restrictive responses of local governments to
undocumented immigration are largely unrelated to the objectively measurable demographic
pressures credited in the conventional model of subnational immigration regulation. Our
evidence discounts the saliency of recent immigrant population growth, the proportion of
Spanish language-dominant households, and local economic and wage stress in the proposal and
passage of such laws. These ordinances are also largely unrelated to the electoral empowerment
of Latinos, given that places with large proportions of Latino residents and citizens are no more
or less likely to propose legislation, whether restrictive or pro-immigrant.
Instead, we find that political factors not commonly cited by proponents of state and local
immigration laws are more important. 31 Importantly, 67 percent of cities with restrictive
ordinances are in Republican-majority counties. Although we do not have finer-grain data on
partisanship for all localities in the United States, we were able to obtain such data on places
with restrictive ordinances.32 Here, too, we find that a high proportion of restrictive ordinances
(77%) have passed in Republican-majority cities. And, partisanship has, by far, the strongest
relationship at the state level. At the state level, nearly two-thirds of restrictive states had a
29

We report findings based on the partisanship of electorates in order to provide a comparable basis of comparison
to our local partisanship measures. The results on partisanship are similar when using measures of party control of
the state legislature.
30
We utilize a resource available via Findlaw that summarizes current state-level policies and code it on the same
restrictive to permissive scale (low to high) as in our analysis of enacted legislation in the 2005-2007 period. State
Immigration Laws, FINDLAW, http://immigration.findlaw.com/immigration-laws-and-resources/state-immigrationlaws/. Data is current as of December 31, 2011.
31
The partisan composition of the area plays an important role, second only to city size. However, because city size
is positively associated with both pro and restrictive ordinances, party composition is the only factor that displays
statistically significant and theoretically consistent effects (negative on the restrictive side and positive on the pro
side).
32
Local party registration data for localities obtained from the voter statistics firm Aristotle, Inc.
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Republican majority of voters during this time period, and for those who have passed major
pieces of restrictive legislation on enforcement and employer verification, the proportion of
Republican-majority states is much higher (94%).33
Thus, our fundamental conclusion on partisanship and subfederal immigration regulation
leads to three important questions: (1) Why is partisanship at the subnational level relevant to
legislation on immigration? (2) How is partisanship utilized to enact immigration laws in places
where demographic pressures are inconsequential? and (3) Who is utilizing and mobilizing the
partisanship dynamic to achieve these legislative goals? Due to space constraints, we limit the
discussion here of the political dynamics that help explain these statistical findings, saving a
larger exploration for our book project,34 but we sketch some brief answers to these questions
below.
First, there is ample survey evidence to indicate that Republican voters, and especially
those who are active in party primaries, care intensely about immigration and hold restrictive
views on the matter.35 When this pattern in public opinion gets harnessed through the primary
process, Republican-heavy areas have enabled primary challengers to mobilize against
incumbents on the immigration issue. Republican incumbents, in turn, have either been defeated
by more restrictivist challengers, or they have themselves taken more conservative positions on
immigration to avoid primary defeat.36
Even in many cities where elected offices are often nonpartisan, contexts of local
partisanship nevertheless continue to matter, as policy activists find it easier to promote
restrictive legislation on immigration in Republican-heavy areas. For example, in 2010, the Los
Angeles Times reported on the successful attempts of a local Tea Party activist in getting
Republican-dominant cities in Southern California, such as Temecula and Murrieta, to pass
restrictive measures, after failing to do the same in larger, politically diverse cities, such as
Riverside and Ontario. 37 Even though city councils in California are nonpartisan bodies, the
proportion of Republican voters in these cities nevertheless still matters for interest
representation. Thus, even for nonpartisan elections and governmental bodies, Republican Party
registration still signals the potential opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to promote restrictive
legislation.

33

This compares to 57% of states with a Republican majority of voters in 2004.
Karthick Ramakrishnan and Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism,
ARIZ. ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2012).
35
Frank Newport, Republicans Prioritize Immigration; Dems, Financial Reform, GALLUP, (April 30, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/127607/republicans-prioritize-immigration-dems-financial-reform.aspx; Lymari
Morales, Americans' Immigration Concerns Linger, GALLUP, (January 17, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152072/Americans-Immigration-Concerns-Linger.aspx.
36
This was evident in Arizona as far back as 2004 and 2006, as long-standing Republican incumbents such as
Congressman Jim Kolbe faced competitive primary elections by challengers focusing on immigration and bordercontrol issues. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006 (Magazine),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15immigration.html.
37
Phil Willon, Conservative Inland Empire Cities Crack Down on Illegal Workers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/14/local/la-me-0212-e-verify-20110214.
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Second, political dynamics at the subnational level on immigration are also tied to
political dynamics at the national level. This is particularly true in the case of restrictive local
policies on immigration, where activist groups such as the Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA have sought to stall moderate legislation at the federal level
that includes some form of legalization, while at the same time fomenting restrictionist
legislation at the state and local level. Rather than hoping or waiting for federal legislative efforts
at bipartisan immigration reform to stall, since 2004 these organizations have pursued a dual
strategy: They purposefully promote legislative gridlock at the federal level, and then cite the
very national legislative inaction they helped foment to justify restrictive solutions at the local
level.38
Finally, since 2006, the work of proliferating legislation at the subnational level has
found its strongest champion in Kris Kobach, a former law professor who has served as legal
counsel for many states and localities that have passed restrictive legislation, both in an
individual capacity and as an employee of the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), the
legal branch of the restrictive group FAIR. Not only has Kobach provided legal counsel for cities
such as Hazleton, PA and Farmers Branch, TX, he has also played a pivotal role in the crafting
of legislation in many of the same jurisdictions, including cities like Hazleton, and states such as
Arizona and Alabama. 39 Thus, while restrictive policies may have local sponsors in each
jurisdiction, the evidence we have analyzed from a variety of news reporting reveals a
nationally-involved group of actors (who we term “restrictive issue entrepreneurs”) who are
advancing—through political rhetoric, legal justification, and the design and promotion of
legislation—a proliferation of subnational policies aimed at “attrition through enforcement,” or
making living and employment conditions so inhospitable to unauthorized immigrants as to
encourage their departure.40

38

Our article, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, ARIZ.
ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2012), details the legislative involvement of FAIR and NumbersUSA. In 2004, while FAIR
was striving to push back against legalization efforts in Washington D.C. following calls for comprehensive
immigration reform by George W. Bush and John McCain, it also gave financial backing to Arizona’s Proposition
200 campaign, a measure modeled after California’s Proposition 187 that sought to deny unauthorized immigrants
access to many public benefits. Steven Wall, Efforts Against Illegal Immigrants Rise, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, Nov.
9, 2004. Indeed, pro-immigrant advocacy organizations in Washington D.C. saw FAIR’s foray into Arizona as
connected to its D.C.-based legislative strategy, as it sought to push back against moderate legislation being offered
by Arizona’s Congressmen Jim Kolbe, Jeff Flake, and Senator John McCain. Interview with immigration advocacy
organization (Apr. 12, 2012); see also Jim Behnke The Tres Amigos - Kolbe, Flake, McCain, SIERRA VISTA HERALD
REVIEW, January 8, 2004.
39
George Talbot, Kris Kobach, the Kansas Lawyer Behind Alabama’s Immigration Law, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile,
AL), October 16, 2011.
40
NUMBERSUSA, How Attrition Through Enforcement Works (noting that immigration raids would be unnecessary
if federal, state, and local enforcement effectively make “living illegally … more difficult and less satisfying over
time”),
https://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/how-attrition-through-enforcementworks.html. See also Michael Williamson, Self-Deportation Proponents Kris Kobach, Michael Hethmon Facing
Time of Trial, WASH. POST, April 24, 2012 (quoting an Oklahoma representative who notes that Kobach and his
partner at IRLI, Michael Hethmon “were the face and the muscle behind the effort that really synthesized it into a
movement. Do I think it would have happened without them? Most certainly it would not have.”),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/time-of-trial-for-proponents-of-selfdeportation/2012/04/24/gIQAe6lheT_story.html.
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While it is also possible for pro-immigration advocates to pursue a similar strategy—of
promoting federal gridlock as a fruitful condition for subnational action—our review of news
coverage and interviews with permissive and restrictive organizations in Washington, D.C.,
shows that pro-immigrant organizations still push for federal solutions as optimal policy,
particularly on matters pertaining to immigration enforcement.41 Accordingly, the integrationist
strategy has focused on Congress enacting comprehensive immigration reforms that they hope
will include DREAM Act provisions and other pathways to legalization. Meanwhile, proimmigrant efforts on matters such as sanctuary city policies and in-state tuition for
undocumented students are driven mostly by local sponsorship, with little coordination in
activity. 42 By contrast, restrictive proposals often feature local sponsors and national
organizations and issue entrepreneurs, with model legislation that is replicated across
jurisdictions.43 Importantly, the main national organizations promoting the spread of restrictive
local measures (NumbersUSA and FAIR) are the same ones who also have played a prominent
role over the past two decades in derailing congressional efforts on immigrant legalization,
keeping viable a plausible case for local action.44
Thus, while local contexts of partisanship matter on both the restrictive and proimmigrant sides of local legislation, the dynamics that produce them are more local in the case of
permissive policies, while federated and coordinated with national organizations in the case of
restrictive legislation. As we discuss in the next section, these differences may have some
significant implications for considerations of federalism, including the relevance of
functionalism, availability cascades, and party federation in producing this subnational variation
in immigration policies.
III.

Implications for Immigration Federalism

As our empirical investigation shows, in subnational immigration regulation,
demography is not dispositive. By in large, subnational regulations are not organic responses to
demographic change, brought on by intractable public policy challenges. Instead, our data and
analysis suggest that interested policy actors present pre-made solutions to politically receptive
jurisdictions, regardless of the underlying demographic pressures in those jurisdictions. This
conclusion challenges existing theories and assumptions regarding the rise, proliferation, and
utility of subnational immigration regulations. 45 Specifically, we draw a contrast with
“functionalist” theories of state and local action that assume the salience of demographic-change
41

We note here that this could also be influenced by the different legal analysis (federalism, preemption) applicable
to pro-immigrant state and local ordinances (which often do not mention citizenship status at all), in contrast to the
legal analysis of enforcement-type state and local provisions (which use immigration status as a trigger).
42
Interview with Angela Kelley, Center for American Progress (2011); Interview with Frank Sharry, America’s
Voice (2012); Interview with Clarissa Martinez, NCLR (2012).
43
For more details, see our book Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: Its
Political Underpinnings and Legal Implications (unpublished manuscript). See also Ian Gordon, How Did Harsh
Immigration Laws Spread to Your Statehouse, MOTHER JONES, March/April 2012; MODEL LEGISLATION,
IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE, www.irli.org/laws (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
44
See Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, supra note 34.
45
An in-depth exploration of the theoretical and constitutional implications of our empirical investigation is featured
in Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The New Immigration Federalism (forthcoming 2013) (draft on file with
authors).
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for policy expression, and with “steam-valve” theories, which suggest that state and local
restrictionist policies relieve pressure on national restrictionist efforts. Finally, we query the
significance of our empirical conclusions for judicial evaluations of subfederal immigration laws.
The fact that partisanship matters more than any other factor suggests that, above all else,
subnational immigration policy expression reflects naked political preference and opportunistic
use of party polarization.46 This conclusion contradicts the assumptions made by scholars who
have argued that what is “missing” from debates over the constitutionality of subfederal
enactments is “a functional account that explains why state and local measures have arisen over
the past five to ten years, and how this reality on the ground should reshape our conceptual and
doctrinal understandings of immigration regulation.” 47 Professor Cristina Rodriguez is correct
that purely legal, constitutional debates over subfederal involvement in immigration – focusing
on federalism and preemption questions – miss crucial “on the ground” factors that should
influence judicial and popular evaluations of these laws. However, the missing reality is not
necessarily the new demography and geography of immigration; rather it is the new politics of
immigration.48
The political and partisan dynamics of immigration suggests that the various state and
local policy instantiations are not the type of policy experimentation imagined by the Supreme
Court 49 and legal scholars. 50 Our model proposes that restrictive subfederal laws are being
proliferated and replicated in multiple jurisdictions, not because the legislation presents a unique
method of addressing an emerging public policy concern, but rather because the political
conditions are ripe for replication. Thus, the policy “experimentation” and replication currently
occurring in the immigration field has little demonstrative value to other jurisdictions; 51 it
changes the terms and tenor of the national debate on immigration, but does not solve the “on the
ground” problems referenced by Rodriguez.
In addition, “steam-valve” theories of subnational policy proliferation also require
reconsideration. It is tempting to agree with Professor Peter Spiro’s intuition that leeway for
isolated, subfederal anti-immigrant regulation relieves pressure to promote the same restrictive
46

See Supra Part II; see also, Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, 110 YALE L.J. at 74-6 (2000) (showing how
limited private information tends to make people follow others, and reach more extreme policy positions).
47
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 4, at 571.
48
We hasten to add that functionalist accounts of subfederal legislation may serve the important purpose of carving
out a normative space for local involvement. It may very well be normatively desirable, as Rodriguez argues, to
locate and institute integrationist measures at the local level. Further, we agree with Professor Rodriguez’s
underlying point that uniformity in immigration policy across the nation may not be necessary or normatively
desirable. Id., at 611.
49
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
50
See Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case For Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENVER U. L. REV. 1061
(2007); Huntington, Immigration Federalism, supra note 4; Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 4
at 609 (“And perhaps most importantly, local experimentalism will be of tremendous value in this context.”).
51
Many of these ordinances, however, do demonstrate the social and economic pitfalls of local regulation. Several
states have abandoned or reconsidered their enforcement-heavy approaches after enactment, and after experiencing
the consequences of such laws.
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policies as federal legislation. 52 Thus, as per his “steam-valve” theory, even if subfederal
restrictionist measures primarily reflect raw political preference (and not necessary responses to
pressing policy problems), those measures in isolated localities could serve a normatively
desirable purpose by providing a relatively contained outlet for anti-immigrant feelings. 53
Specifically addressing Arizona’s SB 1070 and the constitutional challenge to the law, Professor
Spiro argues that “in the long run, immigrant interests will be better helped if the Supreme Court
upholds S.B. 1070….[If the Court strikes it down], anti-immigrant constituencies will redouble
their efforts to enact tougher laws at the federal level.”54
The manner in which these subfederal enactments have been proliferated, however,
indicates that Spiro’s causal story must be reversed: Suppression of subfederal lawmaking does
not promote effectuation of restrictionist measures at the federal level; 55 rather, purposeful
suppression of moderate or compromised federal lawmaking provides the receptive legislative
backdrop for promotion of extreme measures at the subfederal level. The issue entrepreneurs’
goal is to continue proliferation in every jurisdiction that is politically ripe for legislation. Each
successive enactment builds, rather than dissipates, momentum. Specifically, in the immigration
context, we suggest that interested policy activists coordinate activity between the local and
federal levels so that legislative activity at the federal level does not stand as an obstacle to
further subfederal proliferation. 56 In other words, part of the receptive context for continued
subfederal policy proliferation is the strategic stalling of federal legislative responses, until an
acceptable de facto national consensus on restrictionist policies can be instituted at the federal
level.
Finally, our conclusions might have implications for the way courts evaluate state and
local immigration laws. First, the doctrinal basis for subfederal participation in immigration
requires that states establish the “vital necessity” of their immigration regulation.57 In Chy Lung v.
Freeman (1875), the Court found unconstitutional a California law that purported to allow state
officials to make immigration decisions. In doing so, the Court seemed to leave open the
possibility that states might constitutionally enact immigration enforcement laws, but only if
Congress failed to act and it was absolutely necessary for states to protect themselves from
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Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1636 (1997) (“Affording
the states discretion to act on their preferences diminishes the pressure on the structure as a whole; otherwise,
because you don’t let off the steam, sooner or later the roof comes off.”).
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Peter J. Spiro, Let Arizona’s Law Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012,
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Id.; Spiro, Learning to Live, supra note 52 at 1630 (“One must look to the consequence of such suppression and
the possibility that frustrated state preferences may actually prompt the effectuation of anti-alien measures at the
federal level.”).
56
See Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, ARIZ. ST. L. J.
(forthcoming 2012) (using qualitative empirical data to show the highly networked and coordinated work of
immigration issue entrepreneurs at the federal and subfederal levels).
57
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).

16

paupers and criminals. 58 Leaving aside whether Congress’ recent failures to pass federal
immigration law constitute the inaction described in Chy Lung, our conclusion undermines the
narrative of necessity foregrounded in the purpose statements of the several state and local
immigration laws at issue. By extension then, our analysis casts doubt on judicial opinions that
rely on these unsubstantiated claims of state need. While any single jurisdiction might face
objectively measurable policy challenges related to immigration, systemic claims of immigrantinduced problems cannot be substantiated.
Moreover, when enacting jurisdictions are selected because of their partisan composition
(and not their demographic conditions), state and local immigration policy proliferation fails to
achieve most federalism values. Traditional federalism theory suggests some constitutional
leeway might be justified for subfederal policy experimentation that attempts to address
regionally-specific concerns. However, as we have shown, demographic change and its attendant
policy problems are not common to enacting jurisdictions. Therefore, any replication of
subfederal immigration policies does not represent the type of useful policy experimentation
imagined in traditional federalism theory. Indeed, restrictionist advocacy groups produce prepackaged immigration legislation that restrictionist issue entrepreneurs shop to receptive
jurisdictions, regardless of whether that legislation responds to policy challenges within the
jurisdiction. In short, the current spate of state and local immigration laws are an example of
solutions to imagined problems; these jurisdictions are not Justice Brandeis’ idealized
“laboratories of policy experimentation.”
IV.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s indignation about Arizona’s inability to defend itself from
“bearing the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration problem” is a rhetorically compelling
story, but one that lacks empirical support. Unintentionally, however, his foray into an extrajudicial, political missive against the Administration’s prosecutorial priorities sheds a spotlight
on the genesis and essence of the current trend of restrictionist state immigration laws. These
laws do not arise naturally out of economic or social necessity; instead they largely are the
products of political opportunism. In the end, Scalia’s dissent showcases why untested
assumptions about undocumented immigrants are so dangerous. They help form the basis of
impossible theories of the Union, whereby every state possesses the inherent power to expel
inhabitants; they change the constitutional conversation about state immigration regulation,
building an unsubstantiated empirical case for the necessity of state intervention; and finally,
they obscure the highly partisan, well-organized mechanism at work in the creation of these
restrictive laws.
The continuing importance of national immigration legislation was evident once again
during President Obama’s victory speech on the eve of his re-election in November 2012. In the
speech, Obama spoke of “fixing our immigration system” as one of four important policy
58
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priorities for his second term. 59 The same week, news outlets ran front-page stories with
Republican strategists signaling a desire to pass immigration reform to improve their party’s
standing among Latinos.60 Despite this seeming optimism, the party dynamics we uncovered will
make such national legislative change difficult to achieve. Because immigration politics over the
past decade has become victim to intense party polarization, very few, if any, moderate
Republicans remain to create bipartisan reform. Further, as we have noted, the dynamics of our
federalist system incentivize members of Congress to heed the more extreme nationalistic and
xenophobic views of their state and local party compatriots. Finally, even if there is modest
bipartisan support for measures such as immigrant legalization, it remains to be seen whether
Congress will be able to design legislation that “wipes the slate clean” on state and local
immigration laws, invalidating existing ones and preempting the growth of future subfederal
legislation on immigration. Without such preemptive legislation, it is likely that the network of
restrictive issue entrepreneurs will continue their efforts to proliferate legislation at the
subfederal level.
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